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TOTAL DISASTER AND TOTAL JUSTICE:
RESPONSES TO MAN-MADE TRAGEDY
Lawrence M. Friedman*
Joseph Thompson**
INTRODUCTION
This Article is an essay on legal culture, and specifically, on the so-
cial and legal responses to disaster. Disasters are, alas, a constant in
human history. Some are man-made; some are called "natural." Yet,
in a certain sense, all disasters are man-made. Of course, human be-
ings are not responsible for earthquakes, floods, forest fires, and the
like. But they are responsible for whatever it was that put human
beings in the way of harm. Nobody caused Vesuvius to erupt; but if
there was no Pompeii in its shadow, the eruption would have been a
harmless show-nothing more serious than a display of fireworks in
the evening sky. Hence the distinction between man-made disasters
and others is artificial or, perhaps more accurately, a matter of degree.
The title of this Article refers to an idea developed by one of the co-
authors. The general notion is something along these lines: over the
last century-and-a-half or so, attitudes toward calamity have changed
dramatically. What was once accepted or reviled as inevitable, or fate,
came to be seen as somehow anomalous and (more importantly) as
giving rise to a claim for relief or payment. In our times, doctors are
supposed to cure patients. If they fail, something must have gone
wrong; perhaps it was medical malpractice. Accidents must be some-
body's fault; and somebody should pay. Or, if nobody was at fault,
government or some insurance program must take care of the prob-
lem. The age of the poor house turned into the age of social security.
Life, health, and accident insurance became commonplace. So did
auto insurance. Compensation became normal; and the more normal
it became, the more it became expected.
We will take a look at a series of disasters, spread over a period of
about a century, and ending with the tragedy of September 11th, to
see how notions of fault, blame, and compensation changed with
changing times. These disasters are, of course, not a random sample
* Marian Rice Kirkwood Professor, Stanford Law School.
** J.D., 2004, Stanford Law School.
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of calamitous events-there is no way to create such a sample. But
they are among the more important and illustrative catastrophes in
American experience.
II. THE JOHNSTOWN FLOOD
The Johnstown flood occurred on May 30, 1889. The flood claimed
2,209 lives and captured the imagination of the general public. It was
often portrayed as a classic Victorian story of rich against poor. The
disaster was prominently featured in the newspapers, and it led to an
important national (and private) relief effort-the first appearance on
the national stage of a little known organization known as the Ameri-
can Red Cross.
In 1889, Johnstown, Pennsylvania was a bustling industrial center.
The Cambria Iron Company had opened in the post-civil war period.
This company was, during the 1880s, the largest producer of steel in
the United States.1 Johnstown sat on a level flood plain at the conflu-
ence of the Little Conemaugh and Stony Creek Rivers, which ran
down from the mountains that surround the city on both sides. The
population of Johnstown was about 10,000. It was ringed with smaller
boroughs up and down the valley; these brought the area's population
closer to 30,000.2 Most of the working population were employees of
the Cambria Iron Company. 3
The South Fork Dam was located fourteen miles up the valley from
Johnstown, and 450 feet above the town, on the western slope of Alle-
gheny Mountain. The state legislature conceived of the dam project in
1836. The dam and resulting reservoir were intended to provide extra
water for the new canal system between Johnstown and Pittsburgh.
This was an earth dam, 930 feet long, rising seventy-two feet above the
valley floor. The dam was twenty feet wide at the top and 270 feet at
its base. When full, the reservoir behind it covered about 450 acres
and was nearly seventy feet deep in spots. 4 The South Fork Dam was
1. DAVID G. MCCULLOUGH, THE JOHNSTOWN FLOOD 69 (1968); HOWARD MUSON ET AL.,
THE TRIUMPH OF THE AMERICAN SPIRIT: JOHNSTOWN, PENNSYLVANIA 65 (1989).
2. The towns (East Conemaugh, Woodvale, Conemaugh, Cambria City, Prospect, Millville,
Morrellville, Grubbtown, Moxham, and Johnstown) were "clustered between the hills, packed in
so tight that there was scarcely room to build anything more." MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at
28. For a map of the valley from the South Fork Reservoir to Pittsburgh, see Map of the Cone-
maugh Valley, Showing the Ruined Towns and Their Relative Locations, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
1889, at 1.
3. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 28.
4. Id. at 41. Interestingly, newspaper coverage during the aftermath of the flood described the
lake as much larger than it actually was. For example, the New York Times described the lake as
"eight miles long and three miles wide." Hundreds of Lives Lost, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1889, at 1.
See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 219-24; MUSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 106-12.
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completed in the summer of 1852, six months before the Pennsylvania
Railroad put in place the final section of the Philadelphia to Pitts-
burgh line, running between Johnstown and Pittsburgh. The comple-
tion of this final section proved disastrous to the canal system and
made the dam useless.5 The railroad took possession of the South
Fork Dam in 1857 and nobody maintained it, until the South Fork
Hunting and Fishing Club bought it in 1879.
The South Fork Hunting and Fishing Club was formed in 1879 by a
group of wealthy and influential Pittsburgh businessmen who wanted
a way to enjoy the clean air of the mountains. The club was "unos-
tentatious" in comparison to contemporary resorts such as Newport or
Tuxedo Park, but its membership rolls included some of the most
powerful men in the country-men like Andrew Carnegie, Henry
Clay Frick, Andrew Mellon, and future Secretary of State and Attor-
ney General Philander C. Knox.6 The club set about to renovate and
rebuild the dam, which had given way in 1862, probably because van-
dals stole lead from the outflow pipes and weakened the foundation. 7
The dam was rebuilt at a cost of $17,000 in 1880; the rebuilt dam,
however, had no discharge pipe to control the water levels. The club
had also added a screen of iron rods across the spillway to prevent fish
from escaping the reservoir into South Fork Creek.8
The storm started on the Great Plains on May 28, 1889, washing out
roads and delaying trains throughout the Midwest. By the time it
reached Pennsylvania, the storm was the worst ever recorded in that
area.9 By May 31, the Little Conemaugh and Stony Creek rivers were
swelling, and water, from two to ten feet deep, spread across Johns-
town.10 As the citizens of Johnstown tried to save their personal be-
longings, the South Fork Reservoir continued to fill with water from
the mountains above. Staff members attempted to cut a new spillway
through the rocky hillside next to the dam, in order to drop the water
level without risking a breach in the vulnerable center of the dam, but
their efforts were in vain, as were efforts to sandbag the top of the
dam." When it became clear that the reservoir was going to break,
telegrams were sent from the club down the valley, warning of the
5. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 54.
6. Id. at 56-57.
7. Scene of the Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1889, at 1; MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 54.
8. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 76.
9. Thousands Were Lost, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1889, at 1; MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 21.
10. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 82.
11. The Dam Which Gave Way, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1889, at 1; MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1,
at 90-92.
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danger. But the message was not taken seriously in Johnstown; no
general warning was given. 12
When the flooded reservoir finally breached the South Fork Dam
on the afternoon of May 31, the water "cut through like a knife."1 3 It
made a "sound like tremendous and continued peals of thunder"1 4 as
the water rushed down into the valley. The water then "swept onward
to the Conemaugh like a tidal wave, over twenty feet in height, to
Johnstown... gathering force as it tore along through the wider chan-
nel and quickly swept everything before it.' 5 The water destroyed all
but the sturdiest of the buildings in the valley in the ten minutes that it
took to rush through the fourteen miles to Johnstown. Those who
were unable to make it to the higher ground of the valley walls died in
the massive waters. The death toll was put-officially-at 2,209. The
last bodies were not found until 1906.16
The Johnstown flood was front-page news. Headlines shrieked,
"Bodies are Everywhere," 17 "Fifteen Thousand Corpses,"18 and "Om-
inous Silence in the Conemaugh Valley."' 9 Press coverage helped
generate an enormous level of sympathy and charity, greater, perhaps,
than for any previous natural disaster. Just days after the flood, relief
funds began pouring into Pennsylvania from every single state and
fourteen different countries. 20 In early June, a special Flood Relief
Commission was formed to handle and distribute the contributions for
the flood victims. The most pressing concern for the Commission was
to provide adequate food, clothing, and shelter for the survivors in the
valley. 2' After these and other essentials were provided, the Commis-
sion set about to distribute cash relief to the surviving victims of the
flood. The first distribution was a ten-dollar cash payment to each
person "who had in any way suffered loss from the flood, and without
12. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 87.
13. Id. at 100.
14. The Dam Which Gave Way, supra note 11, at 1 (quoting eyewitnesses to the breach).
15. Hundreds of Lives Lost, supra note 4, at 1.
16. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 196.
17. W.I. Kenny, Bodies Are Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1889, at 1.
18. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1. at 219.
19. Thousands Were Lost, supra note 9, at 1; see also MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 205-24
(surveying the hysterical reaction to the flood).
20. Sad Work in Johnstown, N.Y. TIMES. June 5, 1889, at 1: The Work of Relief, N.Y. TIMES
June 6, 1889, at 5; Relief Funds Still Grow, N.Y. TIMES. June 8, 1889, at 5; MCCULLOUGH, supra
note 1, at 224-26; REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE FLOOD RELIEF COMMISSION 107-08 (1890)
[hereinafter RELIEF COMMISSION REPORT].
21. The newly organized American Red Cross and its founder, Clara Barton, played a key
role in the relief effort, erecting two large tent hospitals and six Red Cross hotels; this was the
organization's first major disaster relief effort. See FAIRFAX DOWNEY, DISASTER FIGHTERS 44-
45 (1938); MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 229-31: MUSoN ET AL., supra note 1, at 108.
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regard to the amount of loss."'22 When the Commission made its final
cash distribution, it was wary of providing any victim with a windfall;
funds were allocated on the basis of need and degree of loss, and vic-
tims with small children got the most money.23 In all, the Commission
collected and distributed $3,742,818.78 to the victims of the Johnstown
flood.
2 4
As the relief process got under way, public attention focused on the
question of blame. Newspaper reports began to turn up evidence that
some experts had questioned the safety of the dam long before the
flood.25 In Johnstown and its neighboring boroughs, relations be-
tween the blue-collar communities and the elite club had always been
strained; now, at this point, "feelings were running very strong against
the club." 26 Anti-club sentiments were bolstered by the verdict of the
coroner's jury in Johnstown announced on July 7, 1889. The jury
found that the death of one Ellen Hite was caused by the breaking of
the South Fork Dam, and then went on to condemn the owners of the
dam:
We further find . . . the dam [was not] constructed sufficiently
strong, nor of the proper material to withstand the overflow, and
here we find that the owners of the said dam were culpable in not
making it as secure as should have been done; especially in view of
the fact that a population of many thousands was in the valley be-
low. We hold the owners are responsible for the fearful loss of life
and property resulting from the breaking of the dam. 27
This scathing denunciation of the South Fork Hunting and Fishing
Club helped fuel public outrage against the club. Newspapers con-
demned the club as a playground for the rich. Harrisburg journalist
J.J. McLaurin summarized the anger directed at the club when he
wrote "50,000 lives in Pennsylvania were jeopardized for eight years
[so] that a club of rich pleasure-seekers might fish and sail and revel in
luxurious ease during the heated term." 28
In the wake of this public outrage, several lawsuits were filed
against the club. On July 27, 1889, a suit was brought by the widow
and eight children of John A. Little, who died in the flood. The plain-
tiffs asked $50,000 in damages, and named "half a hundred iron, steel,
and glass barons" as defendants, including Andrew Carnegie. The suit
22. RELIEF COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 39.
23. Id. at 38, 41-43; The Johnstown Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, July 7. 1889, at 2.
24. MuSoN ET AL., supra note 1, at 108.
25. The Dam Which Gave Way, supra note 11, at 1; MCCULLOUGH. supra note 1, at 242-43.
26. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 243.
27. The Johnstown Verdict, supra note 23, at 2.
28. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 249.
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charged that "the lake was dammed to an unusual and useless height
for pleasure purposes, not the public good, [and] that the exits were
insufficient... [and] the construction was faulty. ' 29 The club entered
a not-guilty plea. It claimed the disaster had been a "visitation of
providence. '30 The plaintiffs lost the case. Other victims of the flood
sued the club, but always without success. 31 None of the cases were
reported. But there were other lawsuits arising out of the flood, and
they shed some light on the kind of reasoning and argument that
courts found persuasive. In one of the cases, the plaintiff sued the
Pennsylvania Railroad to recover the value of goods destroyed by the
flood during shipment. At the trial, defense witnesses described "the
great rain-storm that preceded the bursting of the South Fork dam...
the rapidly rising river, spreading beyond its banks, and inundating
portions of the city of Johnstown" and "the appalling wall of water
that came moving down the narrow valley, sweeping away whatever
was in its path."' 32 Citing this and similar testimony, the judge held
that the railroad was not responsible for the loss of any baggage or
packages and called the flood "an inevitable accident, properly de-
scribed as 'actus Dei."' 33 Criminal charges were never filed against
the members of the club.
The reaction to this disaster was, in short, typical of the late nine-
teenth century (and earlier). Relief was the responsibility of private
charities. The "accident" was attributed to natural forces and they
were, thus, nobody's fault. If there was blame-and many people
thought there was, or should be-the remedy, if any, lay in punishing
the guilty. The tort system hardly entered into the picture. Clearly,
the era of "total justice" still lay in the future.
III. THE TRIANGLE SHIRTWAIST FIRE
The Triangle Shirtwaist Fire took place on March 25, 1911. One
hundred and forty-six women, mostly young immigrants, died in the
fire. The fire came to symbolize an age of exploitation of workers,
and the hard life of immigrants who toiled away in factories and
mines. The fire was a tremendous and tragic urban drama. Crowds of
29. The Johnstown Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1889, at 2.
30. See generally Fishing Club Pleads Not Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1889, at 1; MCCUL-
LOUGH, supra note 1, at 258.
31. Seeking Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,1889, at 5; MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 258-62.
32. Long v. Pa. R.R. Co., 23 A. 459, 459 (Pa. 1892).
33. Id. at 460; cf Brown v. Pine Creek Ry. Co., 38 A. 401, 402-03 (Pa. 1897). This case upheld
a jury determination that the Johnstown flood was "such a flood as residents of that neighbor-
hood might, from their observation, expect, and therefore was not extraordinary"; this precluded
the defendant from escaping liability with an "act of god" defense.
[Vol. 53:251
TOTAL DISASTER AND TOTAL JUSTICE
people in the streets watched in horror, helplessly, as the young
women in their white skirts jumped to their death nine or ten stories
below, choosing this quick way to die over the agony of death by fire.
The disaster helped to galvanize support for reforms in labor and
safety conditions. It was a critical event in the history of the move-
ment to curb the most raw and brutal aspects of industrial life.
The Triangle Shirtwaist Company manufactured shirtwaists-inex-
pensive lightweight bodices made of cotton or linen that were popular
with women at the time. The company had already had its share of
notoriety; a strike of its workers grew into a general strike of shirt-
waist workers in New York City known as the "uprising of twenty
thousand. '34 The company occupied the top three floors of the ten-
story Asch building, located just off Washington Square Park in
Lower Manhattan. This was a typical loft building of the period, and
it was in fact considered safer than most. The building was "fire-
proof," and indeed the fire did little structural damage to the build-
ing.35 Still, the building did not have a sprinkler system. These
systems were required in textile mills, but not in buildings like the
Asch building. Instead, the factory had fire pails on each floor, to be
used to put out any fires that might break out.
The shop floors at the factory were arranged with long sewing ta-
bles stretching nearly from wall to wall, with narrow aisles in between,
where the workers sat. The New York labor code mandated 250 cubic
feet of air per worker; but the company was able to pack workers in
very tightly because the building was a loft with high ceilings and thus
had enough air space to meet the ventilation requirements. 36 Under
the existing law, a building of its size required three staircases on each
floor. The Asch building had just two, located on opposite corners of
the building. The staircases were narrow, measuring just two feet,
nine inches in width, and were tapered at the turns. Even worse, the
doors to the staircases opened inward, in violation of existing state
law. 37 Each staircase was paired with a small, slow moving elevator
that could carry a few people at a time. In addition, the building had a
34. Waist Strike On; 18,000 Women Out, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1909, at 1.
35. JOHN F. MCCLYMER, THE TRIANGLE STRIKE AND FIRE 86 (1998); 141 Men and Girls Die
in Waist Factory Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1911, at 1.
36. LEON STEIN, THE TRIANGLE FIRE 23 (1962). Much of the following account of March 25
is adapted from his work, which, in turn, relied heavily on contemporary newspaper and periodi-
cal accounts. The Triangle Shirtwaist fire has been much written and commented on. See Eric
G. Behrens, The Triangle Shirtwaist Company Fire of 1911: A Lesson in Legislative Manipula-
tion, 62 TEX. L. REV. 361 (1983); Arthur F. McEvoy, The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire of 1911:
Social Change, Industrial Accidents, and the Evolution of Common-Sense Causality, 20 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 621 (1995).
37. STEIN, supra note 36, at 22-24.
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fire escape, although it was only wide enough to allow one person to
escape at a time and ended on the second floor. 38
The fire broke out on a Saturday. It was the busy season and the
factory was operating at nearly full strength. Normally, the factory
employed 225 workers on the eighth floor and 350 on the ninth; sixty
workers, mostly clerical staff, were on the tenth floor. Most of the
workers were young Jewish and Italian women; many were recent im-
migrants who spoke little or no English. About fifty of the more relig-
ious Jewish workers were at home because of the Jewish Sabbath, but
most of the workers were the breadwinners in their families and
worked whatever hours they could get.39
The fire began on the eighth floor. A cigarette tossed to the ground
probably set fire to waste material left underneath the worktables.
The waste material and the shirtwaists hanging above immediately
burst into flames. Workers on the eighth floor tried to put out the fire
with the fire pails; but they failed, and the fire soon spread to the
ninth floor through the open windows. Many workers on the eighth
floor were able to escape through the elevators and staircases. On the
tenth floor, nearly all of the sixty workers were able to escape to the
roof. The owners of the Triangle Shirtwaist Company, Max Blanck
and Isaac Harris, later reviled as villains, acted bravely to help work-
ers on the tenth floor reach the roof; from there, law students from
New York University helped them to safety.40 Most of the victims
were working on the ninth floor when the fire broke out. The fire
caught them by surprise; and the entire floor was soon a fiery in-
ferno.41 According to survivors, the door to one of the stairways was
locked and could not be opened by the women inside.42 This forced
the women to try to escape by the other staircase, which was soon
engulfed in flames.
The fire department arrived soon after the fire began, but it was of
little help to the victims. The tallest fire ladder reached only to the
sixth floor and the limited water pressure of the time only allowed fire
hoses to reach the seventh floor. After flames cut off their escape
38. Id.; Quick Grand Jury Fire Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1911, at 5.
39. STEIN, supra note 36, at 30-31; Arthur E. McFarlane, Fire and the Skyscraper: The Problem
of Protecting the Workers in New York's Tower Factories, MCCLURE'S MAG., Sept. 1911, at 473,
474.
40. STEIN. supra note 36, at 48-50; Partners' Account of the Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
1911, at 4; Stories of Survivors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1911, at 4; Rescues by Law Students, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1911, at 4.
41. STEIN, supra note 36, at 54-55.
42. Id. at 58; Locked in Factory, the Survivors Say, When Fire Started That Cost 141 Lives,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1911, at 1 [hereinafter Locked in Factory].
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routes, many of the workers panicked. Some flung themselves down
the empty elevator shafts, while many of the women jumped out of
the windows, to death in the street below, on fire and in each other's
arms.43 Firefighters tried to catch the women by stretching out fire
nets, but the force of the bodies was too much for the nets to bear.44
Others died when the fire escape that they had crowded onto col-
lapsed under their weight. When it was over, sixty-two of the 146 vic-
tims of the fire had jumped to their deaths. Firefighters found thirty
dead in the elevator shaft and forty or fifty piled up against the ninth-
floor doorways. 45
Immediately after the fire, there was an outcry of support for the
victims and horror over the great loss of life.46 What had caused the
tragedy? Discussion focused on such things as the lack of fire drills,
the failure of the fire escapes, and the locked doors.47 The locked door
factor was particularly important; it fueled public anger and pointed
the finger of blame at Max Blanck and Isaac Harris, the coowners of
the Triangle Shirtwaist Company.48 The story that emerged was that
one of the doors on each floor was usually kept locked in order to
control theft. 49
Because of public outrage, the district attorney's office launched an
immediate investigation into the possibility of bringing criminal
charges. Charles Whitman, the District Attorney, promised to con-
vene a grand jury as soon as possible.5 0 The grand jury began investi-
gating the fire in early April and returned an indictment against
Harris and Blanck for first and second-degree manslaughter on April
11. The main basis for the charge was the evidence of the locked
door, which "left no doubt as to the guilt of the partners," according
to the District Attorney.5' Harris and Blanck entered a plea of not
guilty. A week later, on April 18, the coroner's jury likewise called
the owners of the company responsible for the fire disaster.52 Neither
the grand jury nor the coroner's jury found any state or city officials
responsible for the tragedy.
43. Scenes at the Morgue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1911, at 3; Thrilling Incidents in Gotham Holo-
caust That Wiped Out One Hundred and Fifty Lives, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1911, at 2.
44. 141 Men and Girls Die in Waist Factory Fire, supra note 35, at 2.
45. Id.
46. The Calamity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1911, at 14.
47. Lack of Fire Drill Held Responsible, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1911, at 5.
48. Locked in Factory, supra note 42, at 1.
49. STEIN, supra note 36, at 26-27, Locked in Factory, supra note 42, at 1.
50. Whitman Men Seek To Fix Responsibility, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1911, at 4.
51. Indict Owners of Burned Factory, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1911, at 1.
52. Charge Girl's Death to Factory Owners, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1911, at 1.
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Meanwhile, state and local politicians called for an assortment of
political and legal stops to prevent future tragedies. 53 Within weeks of
the fire, the state legislature was moving to enact tighter fire escape
laws and to grant the state labor commissioner greater power to over-
see factory buildings. 54 There was wide popular support for these new
laws; many people were convinced that the true cause of the tragedy
lay in feeble laws and feeble enforcement. 55 Local unions and social-
ists organized meetings to protest against unsafe work conditions. 56
The New York Legislature created a Factory Investigating Commis-
sion on June 30, 1911. The Commission's charge was to investigate
"the existing conditions under which manufacturing was carried on in
so-called 'loft buildings"' and otherwise in order that "remedial legis-
lation might be enacted to eliminate existing peril to life and health"
of workers. 57 The Commission began with an inquiry into the fire
hazard in loft buildings. Ultimately, laws were passed that became, in
a sense, a lasting legacy of the fire. 58
During the scramble to assign blame, there was strong popular sym-
pathy for the victims and their families. Local unions rallied support
for the cause. The climax was a parade of 120,000 working class
women through Manhattan.59 Both the local unions and the Red
Cross began a relief fund for victims of the fire, which soon grew to
the sizeable sum of $120,000.60 The Red Cross set up a committee to
consider the appropriate compensation for the victims in each case
"based on a consideration of the standard of living" of the family of
the person killed or injured.61 The committee made it clear that it was
not attempting "to compensate for loss, in the sense of assigning a
cash value to each life lost and reimbursing to the family that
53. Blame Shifted on All Sides for Fire Horror, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1911, at 1.
54. Fire-Escape Laws To Be Strengthened, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1911, at 3.
55. Public Indifference Held Responsible, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1911, at 3.
56. MCCLYMER, supra note 35, at 96-99; Faint in a Frenzy over Tales of Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
30, 1911, at 1; Public Indifference Held Responsible, supra note 55, at 3; The Sunday Mass Meet-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1911, at 10.
57. N.Y. FACTORY INVESTIGATING COMM., PRELIMINARY REPORT, S. 21-30, 135th Sess., pt. 1,
at 14 (1912) [hereinafter FACTORY INVESTIGATING COMM.].
58. IRWIN YELLOWITZ, LABOR AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK STATE:
1897-1916 94 (1965).
59. 120,000 Pay Tribute to the Fire Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1911, at 1.
60. The Red Cross declared this amount to be "a larger amount, in proportion to the number
of families and the situation caused by the fire, than has generally, if ever, been available for
emergency relief." RED CROSS EMERGENCY RELIEF COMM., EMERGENCY RELIEF AFTER THE
WASHINGTON PLACE FIRE, NEW YORK 7 (1912) [hereinafter 1912 RED CROSS REPORT]; see also
STEIN, supra note 36, at 128 (calling the amount "a huge sum by contemporary standards").
61. 1912 RED CROSS REPORT, supra note 60, at 8.
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amount. '62 Rather, it adhered to the concept of "scientific philan-
thropy," which involved helping the victims without encouraging them
to become dependent on charity. 63 Using this case-by-case system,
the Red Cross distributed some $80,556.16 of the fund to 166 families
who made claims. 64 In the ninety-four claims in which there had been
one or more deaths, the aid ranged from $50 to $5,167.20 and in the
seventy-two in which there had been no deaths, the aid ranged from
$10 to $1,000.65
In addition to the Red Cross relief, the families of twenty-three vic-
tims instituted a lawsuit against the insurance company that under-
wrote the Triangle Shirtwaist Company. Although Harris and Blanck
had recovered over $200,000 from the company for their losses in the
fire, the families settled with the insurance company for $75 per
death.66 In a lawsuit brought by victims directly against Harris and
Blanck, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant coowners. 67
The criminal trial of Isaac Harris and Max Blanck finally began on
December 5, 1911. The trial took place in a circus-like atmosphere,
with a screaming mob attacking Harris and Blanck as they entered the
courtroom for the first time. 68 The indictment, as we noted, rested on
the locked door on the ninth floor that trapped the victims. 69 Under
sections 80 and 94 of the state labor code, it was a misdemeanor to
lock factory doors. The criminal law of New York also recognized the
so-called felony manslaughter rule: causing a death while committing
a misdemeanor was automatically felony manslaughter. 70 The trial it-
self focused on whether or not a door on the ninth floor was actually
locked and, if so, whether Harris and Blanck knew this. The prosecu-
tion also had the burden of showing that the locked door was the
cause of some deaths.
The prosecutor presented witnesses who testified that the door on
the ninth floor was indeed locked on that day; and that this was stan-
62. Id.
63. MCCLYMER, supra note 35, at 104.
64. 1912 RED CROSS REPORT, supra note 60, at 15.
65. Id.; STEIN, supra note 36, at 129.
66. MCCLYMER, supra note 35, at 109; STEIN, supra note 36, at 207; Lives at $75, LITERARY
DIG., Mar. 28, 1914, at 685.
67. Sues for Triangle Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1913, at 7; Jury Disagrees in Triangle Fire Suit,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1913, at 2.
68. Enraged Women Mob Triangle Waist Men, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1911, at 24.
69. People v. Harris, 134 N.Y.S. 409 (Gen. Sess. 1911); Indict Owners of Burned Factory, supra
note 51, at 1.
70. Harris, 134 N.Y.S. at 361-62.
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dard anti-theft practice at the factory. 71 The prosecutor even suc-
ceeded in introducing into evidence the charred remains of a locked
door, which was alleged to be the very door from the ninth floor.
72
Despite this vivid evidence, the jury voted to acquit Harris and Blanck
of the charges on December 27, 1911. 73 This result-which came de-
spite the physical evidence, and the overwhelming public sentiment
against the defendants-has often been ascribed to the brilliant work
of defense attorney Max Steuer, who successfully employed a now leg-
endary strategy by having a key prosecution witness repeat her story
twice on cross-examination. 74 The witness repeated the story nearly
word for word and Steuer was able, subtly, to destroy the value of her
testimony, because it became obvious that she had been coached by
the prosecution and had simply memorized her account of what had
happened.
There was a wave of indignation when the acquittal was announced.
Jurors complained in the press that they felt hamstrung by the judge's
instructions; he had told them that they had to find that Harris and
Blanck knew about the locked door and that it directly resulted in
some specific death.75 Shortly afterwards, women's groups and unions
lobbied the District Attorney to refile charges against the coowners of
the factory for the deaths of other workers in the factory. 76 After the
District Attorney refiled charges in March, a judge ordered the
charges dismissed because the prosecution had no new evidence to
present. 77 This order led to more protests; but the order stood and
Harris and Blanck were never punished for the situation leading up to
the fire.
What is striking, from our standpoint, about this story is how little a
role the issue of compensation played-other than as a form of public
charity. Public indignation led to criminal charges and law reform, but
not to tort actions, and not to reforms in the rules relating to compen-
sation. The failure of the tort system-failure from our standpoint, at
71. Door Was Locked at Factory Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1911, at 3; Girls Fought Vainly at
Triangle Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1911, at 4; Exits Shut Tight at Triangle Fire, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1911, at 3.
72. Fatal Lock Let in Triangle Fire Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1911, at 8.
73. Triangle Owners Acquitted by Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1911, at 1.
74. STEIN, supra note 36, at 191-98. See also People v. Lee, 541 N.E.2d 747, 759 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989) (mentioning Steuer's "brilliant" cross examination in the Triangle Shirtwaist trial). See
ARON STEUER & MAX D. STEUER. TRIAL LAW. 83-100 (1950) (dealing with the technique and
setting out verbatim Steuer's cross-examination of the witness, Kate Alterman).
75. Regrets Voting for Triangle Acquittal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1911, at 8.
76. Women Urge Triangle Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1912, at 18; Mrs. Belmont Sees Whitman,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1912, at 10.
77. Discharge Triangle Owners, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1912, at 3.
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any rate-rested on notions of the inevitability of accident, and, as
Arthur McEvoy has argued, on a "worldview premised on individual
responsibility and exclusively contractual social relations. ' 78 McEvoy
also argues that there might have been some blaming of the victims-
young girls, who reacted in panic, rather than in calm and responsible
ways, which might have saved their lives. 79 Moreover, fear of encour-
aging welfare dependency helped keep the level of compensation
through private charity down. The charitable gifts were doled out ac-
cording to "standard of living." 80 That is, the payments were meant to
restore a balance, an equivalency; they were not meant to redistribute
wealth or income in any way. No one was to gain a windfall because
of the accident.
IV. THE SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA
A German U-Boat sank the steamship Lusitania on May 7, 1915 off
the coast of Ireland. Of the 1,949 persons on board, of whom 702
were crew members, 1,198 died. Although the Lusitania was a British
ship, there were 197 American citizens on board. One hundred
twenty-eight of them died. The incident mobilized American public
opinion against Germany and has been ever since commonly (but
probably wrongly) cited as a key factor in bringing the United States
to the point of war with Germany. 81
When the Lusitania was built in 1907, it was the largest ship in the
world. It could carry 552 passengers in first class, 460 in second class,
and 1,186 in third class, along with a crew of 827. During its first years
in service on the transatlantic route, it was wildly popular and was
considered state of the art and declared by some to be "the world's
most magnificent ship."'82 On its second voyage, the ship broke the
transatlantic crossing record, averaging almost twenty-four knots on
the trip and becoming the first ship to make the voyage in less than
five days.83
In August 1914, Great Britain declared war against Imperial Ger-
many and immediately instituted a naval blockade-a strategy that
proved to be extremely effective. In February 1915, in response to the
blockade, Germany announced it would treat the waters surrounding
78. McEvoy, supra note 36, at 637.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. THOMAS A. BAILEY & PAUL B. RYAN, THE LusrrANIA DISASTER: AN EPISODE IN MOD-
ERN WARFARE AND DIPLOMACY 234-36 (1975); DAVID RAMSAY, LUSITANIA: SAGA AND MYTH
253-65 (2001).
82. RAMSAY, supra note 81, at 25.
83. Id. at 27-28.
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the British Isles as a war zone, in which it was free to sink enemy
ships. This decision-a program of unrestricted submarine warfare-
brought a quick response from the United States. On February 10,
1915 President Woodrow Wilson sent a diplomatic note to Germany
stating that if German submarines were to destroy "an American ves-
sel or the lives of American citizens" it would be "an indefensible vio-
lation of neutral rights" for which Germany would be held "strictly
accountable. 84
Despite President Wilson's message, the danger from German sub-
marines had a dramatic impact on transatlantic passenger traffic.
Also, German-Americans lobbied to get the Wilson Administration to
discourage Americans from traveling on Allied ships. When these ef-
forts failed, a group of leading German-Americans (with the permis-
sion and endorsement of the German Embassy) took out
advertisements on May 1 and May 8, 1915 in numerous newspapers
along the eastern seaboard warning travelers not to embark on Allied
ships. The ads told potential passengers that "a state of war" existed
between Germany and Great Britain, and that "vessels flying the flag
of Great Britain, or any of her allies, were liable to destruction. '85
Finally, they warned: "[T]ravelers sailing in the war zone on ships of
Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk."
Nevertheless, the Lusitania was crowded with travelers-partly be-
cause of cuts in fares-when it left New York City on the afternoon of
May 1, 1915 at the beginning of the tourist season.8 6 As the ship
steamed towards the British Isles, it received a wire from the British
Naval Centre at Queenstown, Ireland on the evening of May 6, warn-
ing "submarines active off south coast of Ireland. T87 The following
afternoon, May 7, a German U-boat torpedoed the ship approxi-
mately fourteen miles off the coast of Ireland. Twenty minutes later
the Lusitania had gone to the bottom. In the cold water, with ill-
equipped lifeboats, the passengers were in a desperate situation; sixty
percent of them died.
The sinking of the Lusitania caused an uproar in the United States.
Newspapers declared the sinking a "slaughter of neutrals and non-
combatants," an act of "unqualified piracy," and a "crime against civi-
84. PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1915 SUPPLE-
MENT 98-100 [hereinafter FOR. RELS., 1915 SUPP.].
85. See Notice!, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1915, at 19; Notice!, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1915, at 21; see
also BAILEY & RYAN, supra note 81, at 74-75 (listing other newspapers in which the advertise-
ment appeared).
86. BAILEY & RYAN, supra note 81, at 128.
87. Id. at 133; RAMSAY, supra note 81, at 51-69 (providing detailed descriptions of the final
voyage of the Lusitania).
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lization. '8 8 Within days of the sinking, relief efforts were begun to
collect funds for the victims and their families. On May 10, New York
City Mayor McAneny created the Lusitania Survivor Relief Commit-
tee with the goal of collecting funds for the victims.89 The Committee
of Mercy immediately sent out a nationwide appeal for donations for
the survivors and was "confident" that it could gather enough funds
"to care for the destitute among those who were saved from the Lusi-
tania, and to relieve the want of those who have been bereft of sup-
port." 90 Within a month, the Committee of Mercy had collected over
$200,000 for the victims.9'
Meanwhile, the American government was concerned with the Ger-
man threat and what the attack meant for American neutrality. On
May 12, 1915, President Wilson sent a note to Germany demanding
financial reparations for the sinking, as well as recognition of the right
of neutral citizens to travel on neutral or belligerent vessels and a
guarantee that no future attacks on ships carrying noncombatants
would occur.92 Germany responded with its own diplomatic note de-
nying responsibility for the disaster and accusing Britain of arming the
ship with deck guns. Germany also alleged that the ship was carrying
troops and munitions, and thus, that it was acting in "self-defense" in
sinking the ship and destroying these war materials. 93 The German
note also suggested that the rapid sinking of the Lusitania and the
great loss of life were caused by ammunition in the ship's cargo hold.94
Germany also offered to submit the matter to The Hague Tribunal for
independent investigation and adjudication and to pay compensation
in all such cases where it was found to be in the wrong. After the
United States entered the war in April 1917, however, it was obvious
that the issue of compensation would have to wait until the end of the
fighting.
The first legal responses to the Lusitania disaster occurred in Eu-
rope. On May 10, 1915, just three days after the sinking, a coroner's
jury in Kinsale, Ireland concluded an investigation into the deaths
aboard the ship and charged the Kaiser and the officers of the subma-
88. Press Calls Sinking of Lusitania Murder, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1915, at 8.
89. Relief Work Started, C.H. Dodge Heads It, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1915, at 3.
90. Nation-Wide Appeal To Aid Survivors, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1915, at 4.
91. Committee of Mercy Fund, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1915, at 9.
92. President Wilson's Note to Germany, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1915, at Al; AuGUST HECK-
SCHER, WOODROW WILSON 366-67 (1991).
93. FOR. RELS., 1915 Supp., supra note 84, at 419-21; Germany Says Lusitania Was Armed; No
Promise To End Submarine War; Note's Terms Surprise Washington, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1915,
at 1-2 [hereinafter Germany Says Lusitania Was Armed].
94. Germany Says Lusitania Was Armed supra note 93.
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rine with "the crime of wholesale murder before the tribunal of the
civilized world . . . committed contrary to international law and the
conventions of civilized nations. ' 95 A more extended inquiry was con-
ducted in London by the government's Board of Trade beginning on
June 15 with Lord Mersey presiding over the proceedings. 96 The pur-
pose of the inquiry was to determine who was responsible for the
deaths on the Lusitania and much of the investigation focused on the
Cunard Company and Captain William Turner.97 After questioning
Turner at length about his decision to operate at less than full speed,
his apparent failure to follow British naval directives for ships operat-
ing in the war zone (specifically, his failure to keep well clear of the
coast and to zigzag), and the crew's failure to save more lives after the
sinking, Lord Mersey exonerated both the Captain and the Cunard
Company. 98 The inquiry held that the ship had been carrying nothing
more than ordinary cargo and that the captain acted within his discre-
tion. The court concluded that the disaster was caused by the torpe-
does fired by a German submarine "with the intention of destroying
the lives of the people on board." 99
The Lusitania disaster was, politically, an event of great signifi-
cance; the fate of the victims and their families was a secondary issue.
But on April 23, 1916, a group of survivors announced their intention
to call a meeting of victims in order to solicit government support for
relatives and dependents of the victims. 00 Shortly thereafter came
the first lawsuit against the Cunard Company for damages, filed by a
woman whose husband died in the disaster.101 The plaintiff claimed
the company was negligent in failing to take proper precautions when
sailing into the war zone. Many more suits were filed in the next few
weeks.102 In total, sixty-seven lawsuits were filed against Cunard,
claiming $5,883,479 in damages for loss of life, personal injury, and
95. Kaiser and His Officers Guilty of Murder, Says Inquest Report on Loss of the Lusitania,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1915, at 1.
96. See BAILEY & RYAN, supra note 81.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. BAILEY & RYAN, supra note 81, at 217-18 (quoting Report of a Formal Investigation into
the Circumstances Attending the Foundering of British Steamship "Lusitania." [Cd. 8022]
(London 1915), in Parliament, House of Commons Sessional Papers, 1914/1916, vol. XXVII);
Puts All Blame on The Germans, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1915, at 1.
100. Call Lusitania Survivors: Meeting Will Seek Government Help for Victims' Dependents,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1916, at 8.
101. Lusitania Widow Sues for $750,000, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1916, at 22.
102. More Lusitania Suits, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1916, at 14; More Lusitania Suits, N.Y. TIMES,
May 6, 1916, at 20.
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lost baggage. These suits were consolidated before Judge Mayer in
the United States District Court in New York City. 103
During the trial, evidence was introduced on Captain Turner's fail-
ure to follow instructions from the British Admiralty, on how to oper-
ate safely in the war zone.10 4 In his decision handed down on April
23, 1918, Judge Mayer explained that the captain had acted within his
discretion and that the threat of submarine warfare was not clear at
the time of the voyage. 0 5 The Judge declared that fault "must be laid
upon those who are responsible for the sinking of the vessel, in the
legal as well as the moral sense."' 0 6 The cause of the deaths "was the
illegal act of the Imperial German government," which violated "a
cherished and humane rule observed, until this war, by even the bit-
terest antagonists."'' 0 7 As for the victims, Judge Mayer stated that al-
though there would be no recovery in this case, "it is not to be
doubted that the United States of America and her Allies will well
remember the rights of those affected by the sinking of the Lusitania
and, when the time shall come, will see to it that reparation shall be
made for one of the most indefensible acts of modern times."'' 08
The press greeted Judge Mayer's decision warmly. The New York
Times hailed the decision as "notably" contributing to "this great field
of jurisprudence" and agreed with the Judge's suggestion: the peace
table was the proper forum for talks of reparations and compensa-
tion.109 According the the Times, there was "no escape" from the con-
clusion that Germany alone was responsible for the deaths. 110
Three years had gone by since the sinking of the Lusitania. The
final push for reparations began after the end of World War I in No-
vember 1918. In March 1919, a board was organized to represent the
interests of the victims of the Lusitania."I The board, headed by
none other than Judge Mayer, hoped to come up with a compensation
figure and submit it to the peace conference in Paris. In the Treaty of
Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919, Germany admitted liability for
acts committed during the war.112 The treaty also provided for the
103. More Lusitania Suits, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1916, supra note 102, More Lusitania Suits,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1916, supra note 102.
104. The Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 728-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 736.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. The Lusitania Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1918, at 8.
110. Id.
111. Call for Lusitania Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1919. at 4.
112. Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919, X. § VI. arts. 297-98, 2 Bevans 43.
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establishment of a "mixed arbitral tribunal" between Germany and
each of the Allied powers to determine and carry out a procedure for
determining compensation for victims of the war.113
But the United States Senate failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles.
The United States did not resume diplomatic relations with Germany
until it signed its own peace treaty in August 1921 (known as the
Treaty of Berlin). This treaty incorporated those sections of the
Treaty of Versailles that dealt with reparations. 114 The Mixed Claims
Commission was established on August 10, 1922 to determine the
amount of Germany's financial obligations under the Treaty of Berlin.
The Commission included two National Commissioners (one from
each government) with authority to decide liability in cases presented
to them. In case of disagreement, an umpire then became the sole
arbiter of liability. 115 When the Commission began its operations, it
grouped claims together based on their common questions or facts so
that they could handle the large workload in a reasonable period of
time.116
The general principles governing the claims before the Mixed
Claims Commission arising out of the sinking of the Lusitania were
announced in a decision handed down on November 1, 1923. In death
cases, the damages would depend on the loss sustained by the depen-
dents of the deceased, not the loss or suffering of the deceased him-
self.' 17 How much would the decedent have contributed to the
claimant, in terms of money or personal services? This was the
formula for compensation, plus a reasonable amount for "such mental
suffering or shock, if any, caused by the violent severing of family
ties."' " 8 The Commission held that no punitive damages would be
available to claimants under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin. 11 9
The first awards were handed down on February 21, 1924, nearly
nine years after the Lusitania went to the bottom of the sea. About
113. Id., X, § VI, art. 304; Will Ask Germany for Claims Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1922, at 1.
114. Treaty Restoring Friendly Relations, Aug. 25, 1921 (Treaty of Berlin), 8 Bevans 145.
115. REPORT OF AMERICAN COMMISSIONER: MIXED CLAIMS COMMISSION UNITED STATES
AND GERMANY 3-4 (1933).
116. Id. at 6.
117. The Lusitania, 2 ANN. DIG. 202 (United States and Germany: Mixed Claims Commission
1923); Commission Backs Lusitania Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1923, at 21; see also REPORT OF
ROBERT W. BONYNGE, AGENT OF THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THE MIXED CLAIMS COMMIS-
SION 14-19 (G.P.O. 1934) [hereinafter BONYNGE REPORT].
118. The Lusitania, supra note 117, at 203.
119. Id. at 209-10.
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$1,000,000 went to the first group of sixty-seven claims.1 20 The Com-
mission's criteria meant that wealthy survivors, in general, got more
money than poor survivors. But the heirs of Albert G. Vanderbilt,
whose estate was valued at $15.6 million, received nothing. The Com-
mission felt that Vanderbilt's will left the beneficiaries with a net gain,
rather than a loss. 12 1
The Mixed Claims Commission ended its labors and made final
awards on December 6, 1925, ten and one-half years after the Lusita-
nia went down. In all, $2,531,685.35 was awarded for losses due to
death, personal injury, or loss of property. 122 The largest award went
to the widow of Albert C. Bilicke, a wealthy Los Angeles real estate
developer; his widow and three children received $140,000.123 Most of
the families received far less.
Here, too, there was little legal recourse for victims. And here, too,
there were attempts to blame individuals (the Captain). But there
was also- the highly convenient presence of an enemy government.
This made it easy to shift the blame (and the duty to compensate) on
to the enemy government. Once again, the rich got more money than
the poor. The aim was to restore the status quo-as it was before the
disaster. And the government took no part in the compensation ef-
fort, except diplomatically.
V. 1927 Mississippi RIVER FLOOD
The great flood of 1927 on the Mississippi River left a total of
16,570,627 acres under water, an area stretching over parts of seven
states and home to a population of 4,459,238 people.1 24 In all, 162,017
homes were flooded, 41,487 buildings destroyed, and $102,562,395
worth of crops lost. 125 Between 250 and 500 people were killed. 1
26
The Red Cross cared for over 600,000 flood victims, including over
300,000 in 154 refugee camps. 127 The Secretary of Commerce, Her-
bert Hoover, coordinated this gigantic relief effort. The publicity, and
120. MIXED CLAIMS COMMISSION: OPINIONS IN INDIVIDUAL LUSITANIA CLAIMS AND OTHER
CASES 353-425 (G.P.O. 1925) [hereinafter LUSITANIA OPINIONS]; Allows $1,000,000 in Lusitania
Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1924, at 1.
121. LUSiTANIA OPINIONS, supra note 120, at 593-95.
122. BONYNOE REPORT, supra note 117, at 17-18; Lusitania Claims All Disposed of- $2,409,413
Awarded, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1925, at 1.
123. LUSITANIA OPINIONS, supra note 120, at 435-38; BONYNGE REPORT, supra note 36, at 17.
124. AMER. NAT'L RED CROSS, THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY FLOOD DISASTER OF 1927: OFFICIAL
REPORT OF RELIEF OPERATIONS OF THE AMER. NAT. RED CROSS, 5 (1927) [hereinafter 1927
RED CROSS REPORT].
125. Id. at 6.
126. PETE DANIEL, DEEP'N AS IT COME: THE 1927 MISSISSIPPI RIVER FLOOD 10 (1977).
127. 1927 RED CROSS REPORT, supra note 124, at 45.
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resulting popularity, served him as a springboard to the presidency.
The flood also led to a landmark piece of legislation, the 1928 Flood
Control Act. This was a law that brought about a level of state in-
volvement in state and local affairs that was largely unprecedented.
Heavy rains began falling across the Midwest in late August 1926,
and, that fall, water levels reached record highs. By Christmas, heavy
flooding was occurring throughout the Mississippi Valley. The river
hit flood stage at Cairo, Illinois on January 1, 1927, the earliest date on
record, while Cincinnati and Pittsburgh flooded later that month.1 28
By February 4, levees had broken along the White and Little Red Riv-
ers in Arkansas, flooding over 100,000 acres and leaving 5,000 home-
less. By March and April, men were working around the clock to
strengthen the levees from Cairo to the Gulf, hoping to stave off the
rising waters. 129 In Vicksburg, Mississippi, 1,500 full-time workers
were employed to protect the levees that kept the river from flooding
the Delta region. 130
As the rains continued, these efforts failed. On April 18, 1927, lev-
ees broke at Mounds Landing, Mississippi and the river slowly poured
through, flooding the entire Mississippi Delta region, an area fifty
miles long and 100 miles wide and home to 185,000 people. The Delta
was covered with water up to twenty feet deep, leaving hundreds of its
residents "marooned on trees, on roofs and anything above water."113'
Thousands were rendered homeless in the Delta; nearly 70,000 left to
live in refugee camps; the rest of the population lived in whatever
makeshift shelter they could find. 132
After the incident at Mounds Landing, the flood became a national
story, but the flooding was far from over. The river soon poured
through the delta and reentered the main channel near Vicksburg
where the added force of the delta water caused levees to break on
the Louisiana side of the river. 133 From this point south, the levees
failed to hold back the water, and the flood covered much of eastern
Louisiana. In New Orleans, a group of government and business lead-
128. JOHN M. BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT Mississippi FLOOD OF 1927 AND How IT
CHANGED AMERICA 179-81 (1997).
129. At this time, the Army Corps of Engineers and the Mississippi River Commission, which
had jurisdiction over flood control efforts on the Mississippi, believed in a "levees-only" policy
for flood control, sealing the river off from natural reservoirs and outlets. In response to earlier
large floods on the River, the Corps had advocated the construction of larger and stronger lev-
ees. See id. at 156-60, 165-66; J.P. KEMPER, REBELLIOUS RIVER 95-110 (1949).
130. BARRY, supra note 128, at 183.
131. Fliers Risk Lives in Flood Rescues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1927, at 1.
132. BARRY, supra note 128, at 206.
133. Big New Crevasse Opens in the Louisiana Levees; 25,000 People in Flight, N.Y. TIMES,
May 4, 1927, at 1.
[Vol. 53:251
TOTAL DISASTER AND TOTAL JUSTICE
ers decided to dynamite downstream levees in order to save the his-
toric city, an action that promised to flood 100,000 acres and turn
10,000 people into refugees. 134 The city promised to provide repara-
tions to those in the rural region and to create a $150,000 fund to care
for the refugees.1 35 In the end, breaks in upstream levees made this
step unnecessary, and those whose homes were destroyed in the flood
received little in the way of reparations from the City of New Orleans
and its business leaders. 136
With the Mississippi Delta under water, the flood had become a
major disaster. On April 22, 1927, just days after the break at Mounds
Landing, President Calvin Coolidge made a national appeal for contri-
butions to the Red Cross.1 37 In a meeting with Red Cross officials on
that day, it was decided that $5 million would be needed to sustain the
relief effort.138 The President appealed for another $5 million for
flood relief on May 2.139 Each of these goals was met, in part because
newspapers rallied their readers to support the cause.140 By May 11,
the Red Cross had its second $5 million. Ultimately, more than $17
million was collected.141 It was the largest fund built up during peace-
time in the history of the organization and the "largest single disaster
relief fund in the history of the world." 142 The Red Cross also col-
lected an estimated $4,538,000 worth of services and supplies from va-
rious federal and state government agencies and from railroad
companies.
The Red Cross used these funds to set up 154 refugee camps in the
seven states hit hardest by the flooding. These camps cared for
325,554 people; the camps included medical facilities, mess halls, rec-
134. Louisiana Levee To Be Cut to Make New Orleans Safe; Wide Area to Be Evacuated, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1927, at 1; New Orleans Awaits Big Explosion to Cut Levee Today at $2,000,000
Cost; Many Refuse to Quit Area to be Flooded. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1927, at 1.
135. BARRY, supra note 128, at 234-59 (describing the backroom political dealing that led to
this decision).
136. Id. at 346-60.
137. Text of President Coolidge's Appeal for Funds to Help Red Cross in Aiding Flood Refu-
gees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1927, at 1.
138. 1927 RED CROSS REPORT, supra note 124. at 13.
139. 172,000 More Imperiled; Coolidge Calls on Nation To Double Flood Relief, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 1927, at 1.
140. Flood Hit More Towns; 200,000 Are Now Destitute; $1,234,000 Given for Relief, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 1927, at 1; President Appeals for $5,000,000 More, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1927, at 1.
See also 1927 RED CROSS REPORT, supra note 124, at 12-17.
141. 1927 RED CROSS REPORT, supra note 124, at 18-19.
142. Id. at 11.
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reation areas, and even extension classes. 143 In addition to the refu-
gee camps, the Red Cross also gave relief to another 311,922 people
who were able to find shelter in their own communities, often on the
upper floors of larger buildings.1 44
On the same day that he made his first appeal for contributions,
President Coolidge also created a special cabinet committee to coordi-
nate rescue and relief efforts. The committee was to be headed by the
Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover. 145 Hoover immediately
took charge of the relief effort. From headquarters in Memphis, Ten-
nessee, he worked to coordinate the efforts of the local Red Cross
chapters. Together with James Fieser, the acting Commissioner of the
American National Red Cross, Hoover allocated funds to each county
and local chapter and became the public face of the relief effort. 146
Hoover was also instrumental in developing and coordinating the
Red Cross's rehabilitation program for the flooded region that began
soon after the waters receded. 147 He and Fieser distributed a list of
goods to be given to families on the basis of need, including: seed, a
temporary supply of food and livestock, farm implements, and simple
household furniture.1 48 The reconstruction plan, however, was more
ambitious than a simple provision of goods. Hoover tried to end the
dependence of the region on cotton and sugar by distributing soybean
and other vegetable seeds, which he believed would "lift the entire
region out of squalor."' 149 The reconstruction effort was (in Hoover's
view) not purely an act of charity. Rather, the project was, Hoover
felt, "based on self-help, credit, employment and relief.' ' 150 Hoover
set up credit organizations to aid farmers in the flood regions. Largely
by force of his own personality, Hoover was able to raise $13 million
in credit to be loaned out to farmers in the affected region; however,
143. L.C. Speers, The Red Cross Takes Up a Titanic Task, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1927, at 1: 1927
RED CROSS REPORT, supra note 124, at 38-44. See also DANIEL, supra note 126, at 91-104 (re-
porting on life in the refugee camps).
144. 1927 RED CROSS REPORT, supra note 124, at 45.
145. Also appointed to the committee was Secretary of Treasury Andrew Mellon, who in 1889
was a member of the South Fork Hunting and Fishing Club.
146. 1927 RED CROSS REPORT, supra note 124, at 25-26; BARRY, supra note 128, at 287-89,
374-75.
147. 1927 RED CROSS REPORT, supra note 124, at 61 ("The work of reconstruction was per-
sonally directed by Secretary Hoover and Vice Chairman Fieser.").
148. Id. at 59-60.
149. BARRY, supra note 128, at 365.
150. 1927 RED CROSS REPORT, supra note 124, at 60.
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in the end, the lack of available collateral and the overall poverty in
the region thwarted his efforts. 151
While Hoover was campaigning for and implementing his rehabili-
tation program, many people called for President Coolidge to convene
a special session of Congress to discuss the appropriation of federal
relief funds for the flood victims. Newspapers throughout the country
ran editorials pleading with the President to call on Congress to meet
and provide reliefZ152-a special session that would respond to the
"grave crisis" facing victims. 153 Senator Robert M. La Follette, Jr. of
Wisconsin referred to "many great disasters, not only in this country,
but abroad, that have been the occasions for appropriations by Con-
gress," and called for immediate action. 154 President Coolidge re-
sisted these calls; he insisted that Red Cross funds would be sufficient
to care for the victims. In his annual message to Congress, the Presi-
dent made clear his opposition to federal relief to individual victims:
The Government is not an insurer of its citizens against the hazard
of the elements. We shall always have flood and drought, heat and
cold, earthquake and wind, lightning and tidal wave, which are all
too constant in their afflictions. The Government does not under-
take to reimburse its citizens for loss and damage incurred under
such circumstances. It is chargeable, however, with the rebuilding
of public works and the humanitarian duty of relieving its citizens of
distress. 155
Coolidge persisted in his refusal to call Congress together and to
insist that relief was not an activity the federal government should
carry out. 156 Eventually, calls for an extra session of Congress died
down. By the time Congress reconvened in January 1928, the Red
Cross rehabilitation project was well under way and the flood was no
longer front-page news. The idea of federal relief quietly evaporated.
151. Move To Restore Flooded Regions, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1927, at 6; BARRY, supra note
128, at 365-69; DANIEL, supra note 126, at 133-37. See also Bruce A. Lohof, Herbert Hoover,
Spokesman of Humane Efficiency: The Mississippi Flood of 1927, 22 AM. Q. 690 (1970), discuss-
ing Hoover's reconstruction plan and how it related to his overall political philosophy.
152. BARRY, supra note 128, at 372-75. A notable exception to this trend was the New York
Times, which consistently applauded the President's refusal to reconvene Congress, agreeing that
the Red Cross relief funds were sufficient to care for the victims. Getting Ready for Congress,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1927, at 24.
153. Urge Extra Session for Flood Victims, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1927, at 2; Finds South Wants
Congress Called, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1927, at 9; Calls on Coolidge for Flood Action, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 1927, at 10; Ask Extra Session One Month Earlier, N.Y. TIMES. May 21, 1927, at
20.
154. Urge Extra Session for Flood Victims, supra note 153, at 2.
155. 69 CONG. REC. 7126 (1928).
156. Coolidge Orders Mississippi Survey, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1927, at 1; Coolidge Won't Call
Congress for Flood, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1927, at 2.
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But both Coolidge and Congress were ready to take far broader ac-
tion-though of a different nature.
Throughout 1927, along with calls for federal relief funds for flood
victims, there were calls for federal flood control measures on the
Mississippi and its tributaries. There seemed to be a growing national
consensus that flooding on the river was a national problem and that
the federal government should assume control of flood control
projects.157 As Senator James E. Watson asked rhetorically, "If thirty-
one states drain into the Mississippi and if more than 600,000 of our
own people in these great river States are rendered homeless and des-
titute by the flood, due largely to that cause, does not that make it a
national problem?"'158 Even Hoover, known for his advocacy of rug-
ged individualism, supported a federal flood control program, coming
up with his own plan that would cost Congress $15 to $20 million a
year for ten years.159
Despite the consensus that something had to be done, questions re-
mained about the relative roles of the national and local govern-
ment.160 President Coolidge promised to oppose any legislation that
did not require state and local governments to match federal contribu-
tions. 161 Coolidge was worried about the federal budget; he told Con-
gress that the federal government "should bear the portion of the cost
of engineering structures for flood control that is justified by the na-
tional aspects of the problem and the national benefits.' 62 The states,
however, "should share with the Federal Government the burden of
assisting the levee districts and individual property owners, especially
in view of the fact that the States benefit directly by the increased
taxes from land made more valuable by reason of its protection. ' 163 It
would be "revolutionary" and "unwise" for the federal government to
assume all the costs of the program. 64 Yet much of the flooded re-
gion was poor and devastated; making matching contributions would
157. See Congress To Act on Flood Perils, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1927, § 9, at 13; Urge Coolidge
Call for Flood Parley, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1927, at 24; Hoover Flood Plan Asks $200,000,000,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1927, at 1; BARRY, supra note 5, at 399.
158. Urge Coolidge Call for Flood Parley, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1927, at 24.
159. Mr. Hoover's Plans For Flood Control, LITERARY DIG., Aug. 6, 1927, at 10; Hoover
Flood Plan Asks $200,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1927, at 1.
160. In Congress, there was also debate and controversy about the extent to which a possible
federal program would cover tributaries of the Mississippi and other rivers prone to flooding.
See, e.g., 69 CONG. REC. 5485-91(1928).
161. Holds Flood Bill Is 'Log Rolling,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1928, at 11; Coolidge Takes Up
Flood Bill Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1928, at 25.
162. 69 CONG. REC. 7126 (1928).
163. ld.
164. Id.
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hit these areas hard. And a flood control system is only as good as its
weakest link.
After some debate, a compromise was finally reached. State and
local governments would get credit for past expenditures on flood
control, estimated at $300 million. This would be counted as their
share of the cost. 165 On May 15, 1928, President Coolidge signed the
Jones-Reid Flood Control Act, which provided $325 million for the
construction of a national flood control program on the lower Missis-
sippi.166 Upon its passage, Congressman Frank Reid declared it "the
greatest piece of legislation ever enacted by Congress."'1 67 Although
nothing in the Flood Control Act provided any money for victims, it
was nonetheless an unprecedented federal response to a natural disas-
ter. Even before the bill passed, it was thought that three hundred
million dollars was a low estimate of the real cost. Many people be-
lieved the final costs would be as much as $1 billion.168 In the opinion
of some, the law "set a precedent of direct, comprehensive, and vastly
expanded federal involvement in local affairs," and perhaps even a
"major shift in what Americans considered the proper role and obliga-
tions of national government.' 69
Flood control looks to the future; compensation to victims looks to
the past. As in the other cases, private charity bore the main burden
of relief. Race and class were important factors in the relief effort.
Blacks were victimized by the flood, and also by the white establish-
ment, which forced many black men to labor on levees under a system
that came suspiciously close to slavery.1 70 It is significant in the flood
story that there were also calls for direct federal intervention. A very
conservative President helped block any such moves. Unlike other
disasters, the sheer scale of this one, geographically speaking, made it
national in a way that, say, the Johnstown flood was not. A flood is, of
course, an "act of God" and obviously nobody sues God. But there
was no shortage of people and institutions to blame, if that had been
the tenor of the times. The immediate cause of the disaster, for exam-
ple, was not the heavy rains or the flood stage of the river, but the
failure of man-made levees.
165. 69 CONG. REC. 5486 (1928) (statements of Senators Simeon D. Fess and Wesley L.
Jones).
166. Jones-Reid Flood Control Act, S. 3740, 70th Cong. (1928).
167. BARRY, supra note 128, at 406.
168. L.C. Speers. Flood Control Nears Crucial Test, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1928, at 4.
169. BARRY, supra note 128, at 407.
170. Id.
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VI. THE COCOANUT GROVE FIRE
The Cocoanut Grove was a popular Boston nightclub during the
1930s and 40s. It was owned, first by Charles "King" Solomon, a
member of the mob, in the early 1930s, and then by his attorney, Bar-
ney Welansky, after Solomon died in 1933. When Prohibition ended,
and later during World War II, Cocoanut Grove became one of the
most notable nightspots in Boston. Well-known show-business people
performed there; and the master of ceremonies, Mickey Alpert, and
his band, became stars. 171 During the war, scores of servicemen
flocked to the nightclub, along with many college students. In the late
1930s and early 1940s, the club expanded; it became a maze of bars
and dance floors. The main entrance on Piedmont Street led into a
lobby, beyond which was the "swank" main dining room.1 72 This main
room featured, in addition to a dining area, a bandstand and large
dance floor, a bar, and a small VIP section known as the Terrace over-
looking the dance floor. Surrounding the dance floor were large imi-
tation palm trees, which gave the club its South Seas atmosphere
(hence the name, Cocoanut Grove). Directly underneath the main
dining room, the basement had been converted into what was called
the Melody Lounge, a dimly lit piano lounge next to the kitchen. On
the main level, directly behind the band stage, another bar had re-
cently been added, known as the "New Cocoanut Grove Lounge."'1 73
The Cocoanut Grove fire broke out on the night of November 28,
1942. The club was as full as it had ever been that night, with fans
from a football game between Holy Cross and Boston College joining
the usual crowds. 174 Although the official capacity was only 600, there
were more than 1,000 people in the club that night. The fire began
downstairs in the Melody Lounge when a sixteen-year-old bus boy,
Stanley Tomaszewski, lit a match in order to replace a light bulb in the
dimly lit bar. The match set fire to one of the highly flammable artifi-
cial palm trees. The fire spread quickly throughout the lounge and,
within a few minues, it had spread to the main dining room upstairs.1 75
With screams of "fire," the large crowd broke into panic. Some peo-
171. EDWARD KEYES, COCOANUT GROVE 181-88 (1984). Very little has been written about
the Cocoanut Grove fire. Much of the following narrative has been derived from Keyes' account,
as well as that of Paul Benzaquin, which seem to be the only existing historical accounts. PAUL
BENZAQUIN, HOLOCAUST! (1959).
172. KEYES, supra note 171, at 18-19. Both Keyes' and Benzaquin's narratives include layouts
of the club's interior.
173. Id.
174. 300 Killed by Fire, Smoke and Panic in Boston Resort. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1942, at 1.
175. Id. at 35; Meyer Berger, Throng Seared by Flame in Spread of 15 Seconds, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 1942, at 1.
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pie in the Melody Lounge found a concealed door that led to the
kitchen; from there, a number of them were able to make it upstairs to
the main dining room. As the fire reached the main floor, there was
total pandemonium. Throngs of people rushed to the main entrance,
a revolving door. The wine steward attempted to uncouple the cables
on the revolving door, but the crush of people prevented this. 176
Other doors leading out of the main dining room were concealed or
locked. From the "New Cocoanut Grove Lounge," located behind the
main dining room, patrons rushed to escape through a door that led to
a small vestibule and then to the street. Unfortunately, this door, al-
though unlocked, opened inward; only a few people were able to get
through before the mob pressed it shut. In all, the fire claimed 492
lives, with bodies piled up against the revolving and inward-opening
doors, hundreds of people who had been trapped by their own desire
to escape. 177
On Sunday morning, the Fire Commissioner, William Reilly, began
an investigation into the cause of the fire. The Commissioner held
public hearings that week; victims testified about the lack of exits
from the building and the general panic that accompanied the fire.178
Stanley Tomaszewski, the bus boy whose match started the fire, was
also called to testify, which he did with amazing candor.179 The public
hearings lasted through December. There was much evidence given
about the fire, and the nightclub's operations in general. Some of this
evidence bore on official negligence. Lieutenant Frank Linney, of the
Fire Prevention Division of the fire department, was called to the
stand; he had inspected the nightclub just eight days before the fire.180
Linney defended his report, which declared the club in "good" condi-
tion with a "sufficient number of exits" and extinguishers. 81
At the hearings, too, there were suggestions that the owner, Barney
Welansky, had used his political influence and his ties with organized
crime to get special favors for the club from public officials. 182 Police
captain Joseph Buccigross had been at the club, in street clothes, the
night of the fire. He had escaped. There were rumors of police im-
propriety.1 83 Henry Weene, an electrician who had done work at the
176. BENZAQUIN, supra note 171, at 40-41.
177. Catastrophe: Boston's Worst, TIME, Dec. 7, 1942, at 26.
178. BENZAQUIN, supra note 171, at 187; KEYES, supra note 171, at 165-67; Frank S. Adams,
Fire Deaths at 487; Grand Jury To Act, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1942, at 1.
179. KEYES, supra note 171, at 167-68; Adams, supra note 178.
180. BENZAQUIN, supra note 171, at 187-90; KEYES, supra note 171, at 146-47.
181. BENZAQUIN, supra note 171, at 188-90; KEYES, supra note 171, at 146-47.
182. BENZAQUIN, supra note 171, at 203; KEYES, supra note 171, at 144-45
183. BENZAQUIN, supra note 171, at 192-93.
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club, told a disturbing story. He had suggested to Welansky that they
needed a permit for the job. Welansky supposedly replied, "You
won't have to get a permit because [Mayor] Tobin and I fit. They owe
me plenty down there. '1 8 4
As always after great disasters, there was considerable public out-
rage. The stories of people trapped by revolving doors, and the grue-
some fate of the burn victims, made this almost inevitable.185 There
was a demand to do something about the city officials who had al-
lowed the tragedy to happen. 186 In an editorial just a few days after
the disaster, the New York Times declared that the blame rested not
on the bus boy whose match lit the fire, but rather "on the proprietors
of the establishment and on the city officials of Boston." 187
The Massachusetts Attorney General and the local District Attor-
ney began their own joint inquiry into possible criminal negligence a
week following the fire. In the meantime, the Governor ordered the
suspension of all entertainment licenses in Boston pending inspection
of premises by the Fire and Building Departments. 18 8 The investiga-
tion soon began to center on city officials who were responsible for
ensuring that the night club was up to code, as well as on Barney We-
lansky, who had apparently used his political influence to avoid com-
pliance with safety laws. The Attorney General and District Attorney
convened a grand jury on December 7. The grand jury returned in-
dictments against ten people on December 31, 1942, barely a month
after the fatal fire took place: Barney Welansky; his brother James
Welansky, who was running the club at the time of the fire (Barney
was recovering from a heart attack); and Jacob Goldfine, the wine
steward who had tried to uncouple the revolving door, were charged
with thirty-two counts of manslaughter. 89 Four city officials were in-
dicted for neglect of duty: Building Commissioner James Mooney,
Building Inspector Theodore Eldracher, Fire Lieutenant Frank Lin-
ney, and Police Captain Joseph Buccigross. 190 Finally, five men were
charged with "conspiracy to violate the building laws": Barney and
184. Id. at 201; Says Club Operator Boasted of Influence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1942, at 12.
185. Victims Describe Fire Horror Scene, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1942, at 1.
186. BENZAQUIN, supra note 171, at 203; KEYES, supra note 171, at 144-45.
187. It Needn't Have Happened, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1942, at 24.
188. Frank S. Adams, Boston Shuts Clubs and Begins Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1942, at 52.
189. BENZAQUIN, supra note 171, at 206-07; KEYES, supra note 171, at 204-05; Ten Are In-
dicted in Night Club Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1943, at 1.
190. BENZAQUIN, supra note 171, at 206; KEYES, supra note 171. at 204-05.
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James Welansky, architect Reuben Bodenhorn, contractor Samuel
Rudnick, and his foreman David Gilbert. 191
The manslaughter trial against the Welansky brothers and the stew-
ard Goldfine began on March 15, 1943. The trial lasted about a
month, during which the state accused the defendants of wanton and
reckless operation of the club through the installation of defective wir-
ing and flammable decorations, the absence of fire doors and suffi-
cient exits, and overcrowding.19 2 On April 11, the jury acquitted
James Welansky and Jack Goldfine of all counts. 193 Barney Welansky,
however, was found guilty of nineteen counts of manslaughter and
sentenced to twelve to fifteen years' imprisonment. 194 Welansky later
appealed that decision on the grounds that he had not been present at
the club the night of the fire; in fact, he had not been there for at least
two weeks because of his heart attack. 195 The court upheld the con-
viction, holding that, as the owner of the club, Welansky had a duty of
care and that, in failing to exercise that duty, he had exhibited a "wan-
ton" and "reckless failure to care for the safety of patrons."'1 96
The second trial for conspiracy to violate building laws resulted in a
single guilty verdict against Samuel Rudnick, the building contractor
for the Cocoanut Grove. Rudnick was sentenced to a two-year prison
term, but appealed immediately, arguing that one person alone cannot
be guilty of conspiracy. 197 The verdict was upheld on appeal on the
grounds that Rudnick was found guilty of conspiring with Welansky,
though not with his codefendants (Welansky, however, had not been
charged with conspiracy).' 98
The courts proved much kinder to the city officials charged with
negligence as a result of the fire. Fire Lieutenant Linney went on trial
in November 1943, charged with willful neglect for pronouncing the
nightclub in "good" condition in his inspection just eight days before
the fire. 199 Linney was acquitted of the charges. 200 The charges
191. BENZAQUIN, supra note 171, at 205-07; Ten Are Indicted in Night Club Fire, supra note
189.
192. Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 907 (Mass. App. Ct. 1944).
193. BENZAQUIN, supra note 171, at 210; KEYES, supra note 171, at 242.
194. BENZAQUIN, supra note 171, at 208-09; KEYES, supra note 171, at 230; Night Club Owner
Guilty in Boston, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1943, at 28; Gets 12 to 15 Years in Night Club Deaths, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 1943, at 23.
195. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d at 908.
196. Id. at 912.
197. Commonwealth v. Rudnick, 60 N.E.2d 353 (Mass. App. Ct. 1945); Guilty in Night Club
Fire, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1943, at 15.
198. Rudnick. 60 N.E.2d at 355.
199. BENZAQUIN, supra note 171, at 210; KEYES, supra note 171, at 242.
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against Building Commissioner Mooney and Police Captain Buc-
cigross were dropped with little fanfare in 1944.201
As for reparations, in the first few months after the fire, more than
500 claims were filed for over $8 million in damages. 20 2 These claims
went nowhere, however, because the club was not legally required to
carry liability insurance on its patrons. Furthermore, the total amount
of fire insurance on the building came to a paltry $22,000.203 The
Grove's precarious financial situation frustrated any potential civil
suits. Moreover, Welansky was indicted by a federal grand jury for
evasion of federal income and profit taxes, an action that threatened
to wipe out any potential recovery. 20 4
In the face of this financial mess, the court appointed two attorneys
to act as receiver and trustee of the Cocoanut Grove and to handle
possible reparations. 20 5 Although initial claims amounted to over $8
million, by 1945 there were only about $200,000 left in assets from the
club to be divided among the 500 claimants, and much of this money
was tied up in tax liens against Welansky.206 The attorneys finally
were able to negotiate a settlement with the Treasury department, and
eventually, each claimant received about $160.20 7
It is not clear whether the victims got anything more. One source
claims that "private insurance firms paid" about two million dollars to
beneficiaries of Grove victims, in addition to $80,000 in fire insurance
on the Grove and its contents.20 8 But this could not be confirmed, and
the financial troubles of the nightclub would seem to have been a ma-
jor obstacle to recovery. 209
The Cocoanut Grove tragedy came at a time when the "liability ex-
plosion" was just getting underway. The urge to pin the blame on
somebody, however, manifested itself chiefly in the criminal charges
that were brought. The victims and their families apparently got little
or nothing by way of compensation. Even the criminal trials were, for
the most part, failures.
200. BENZAQUIN, supra note 171, at 210; KEYES, supra note 171, at 242; Fire Officer Not
Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1943, at 21.
201. BENZAQUIN, supra note 171, at 210-11; KEYES, supra note 171, at 242-43.
202. KEYES, supra note 171, at 212.
203. Id. at 254-55.
204. Welansky v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.M. (P-H) 46, 186 (1946).
205. KEYES, supra note 171, at 254.
206. Id. at 254-55.
207. Id. at 255.
208. BENZAQUIN, supra note 171, at 230.
209. Id. at 197-98.
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VII. THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER OF 1947
On April 16, 1947, the French freighter S.S. Grandchamp exploded
in the port of Texas City. The ship was being loaded with ammonium
nitrate fertilizer. The fertilizer had been manufactured in a govern-
ment plant and was being sent to France as part of the post-war aid
program. The explosion was so powerful that it registered on seismo-
graphs 900 miles away in Denver.210 It set off a fire that led to the
explosion of another ship shortly afterwards; and it ignited the nearby
Monsanto petrochemical plant. The town of Texas City was deci-
mated. Nearly 600 people died, and 3,500 were injured.
The victims filed hundreds of lawsuits against the United States
government under the recently passed Federal Tort Claims Act.211
Beginning in April 1948, 273 suits were brought by 8,485 victims. Of
these, there were 1,510 death claims, 988 claims for personal injury,
and an additional 5,987 claims for property damage. 212 These claims
were consolidated into a single test case examining the possible liabil-
ity of the federal government for losses in this disaster.21 3
The plaintiffs charged that the government had been negligent in
manufacturing, shipping, handling, and labeling the ammonium ni-
trate fertilizer. The fertilizer, they claimed, was known to be highly
explosive and very dangerous, and was shipped without labels identi-
fying it as such. 214 Two years later, after a long trial (the transcript ran
to some thirty-nine volumes and nearly 20,000 pages), the district
court judge found in favor of the plaintiffs.215 In his findings of fact,
the judge held that "[the federal government], its servants, agents, and
employees were fully aware that such Fertilizer was a fire hazard and
an inherently dangerous explosive, and Defendant was guilty of negli-
gence... [which was] a proximate cause of the fire and explosions and
the injuries of which Plaintiffs complain. ' 21 6 The court awarded
$75,000 to the surviving wife and son of Henry Dalehite, a sea captain
210. BILL MINUTAGLIO, CITY ON FIRE: THE FORGOTTEN DISASTHER THAT DEVASTATED A
TOWN AND IGNITED A LANDMARK LEGAL BATTLE 110-11 (2003). For more on the disaster and
the Red Cross relief effort, see AM. NAT'L RED CROSS, TEXAS CITY EXPLOSION, APRIL 16, 1947:
OFFICIAL REPORT OF RELIEF OPERATIONS (1948).
211. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1946).
212. In re Tex. City Disaster Litig., 197 F.2d 771, 772 (5th Cir. 1952). See MINUTAOLIO, Supra
note 210, at 224-57, for a general outline of the litigation from beginning to end.
213. In re Tex. City Disaster Litig., 197 F.2d at 772.
214. Id. at 772-73.
215. Texas City Disaster: Hearings on H.R. 296 Before a Spec. Subcomm. of tile House Judici-
ary Comm., 83d Cong. 248-76 (1954).
216. This statement summarized the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the district
court judge in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). Id. at 248-76 [hereinafter 1954
House Judiciary Hearings].
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who perished in the explosion.217 This amount was based on his ex-
pected future earnings. 218
The ruling was immediately appealed and two years later, in June
1952, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed the decision. The court held that the suit did not fall within the
scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act.219 The court interpreted the
new act very narrowly; under it, the court said the government could
not be held liable for "the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the government, whether or not"
that discretion has been abused. 220 In its opinion, the appellate court
said the decision to use and ship the explosive fertilizer was a "calcu-
lated risk" within the discretion of the government.221 A year later,
the United States Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit's narrow
construction of the FTCA in a "controversial" 222 four to three
decision.223
After the Supreme Court decision, U.S. Congressman Clark
Thompson, who represented Texas City and the surrounding area,
sponsored a resolution that would set up a special subcommittee to
"make a full and complete investigation and study of the merits of the
claims against the United States for compensation for property dam-
ages, personal injuries, and death alleged to have been caused by the
explosions in Texas City. '224 Interestingly, the subcommittee went to
special lengths to disclaim any intention of challenging the legality of
the "controversial opinion" of the Supreme Court, although there was
much discussion on that very point.225 In fact, Congress seemed
clearly uncomfortable with the decision, and the holding of the Su-
preme Court seems to have been one major reason why Congress was
willing to consider granting direct aid to the victims. Both the House
and the Senate took up various proposals for victim compensation
217. Id. at 269.
218. Id. at 268.
219. In re Tex. City Disaster Litig., 197 F.2d at 781.
220. Id. at 778.
221. Id.
222. 1954 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 216. at 2.
223. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). Two Justices, Douglas and Clark, took no
part in the case for undisclosed reasons.
224. 1954 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 216, at 2-5; see also MINUTAGLIO, supra note
210, at 258-62 (detailing plaintiff's attorney, Russell Markwell's, efforts promoting relief
legislation).
225. See, e.g., 1954 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 216 at 7-16: Texas City Disaster:
Hearings on H.R. 9785 Before a Spec. Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 83d
Cong. 12-27 (1954) [hereinafter 1954 Senate Judiciary Hearings].
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over the next two years. During the debates and subcommittee meet-
ings, much was made of the fact that the fertilizer that caused the ex-
plosion in Texas City was being shipped to France as part of a
program to assist that nation in its post-war redevelopment. 226 Sena-
tor Marion Daniel described it as "an ironical situation if we cannot
grant relief to those American citizens who were injured and dam-
aged, and their families killed, by reason of the humanitarian act that
we were trying to perform for foreign citizens. ' 227 It was also sug-
gested that Congress would have been quick to offer disaster relief, if
the disaster had happened overseas.228
On August 12, 1955, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the
Texas City Claims Act into law. 229 The Act directed the Secretary of
the Army to investigate and settle all claims against the United States
stemming from the explosion. 230 The Act set a cap of $25,000 on all
death, personal injury, and property claims.231 Awards granted would
be reduced by the amount of any insurance payments already received
for the loss or injury, and the awards would not include any amount
for reimbursement of insurance companies that had made payments
on account of the disaster. 232 In addition, only those who had filed
suit against the government prior to April 1950 were eligible for
compensation. 233
The Army reviewed and investigated claims in Texas City for the
next two years. In all, 1,394 awards were made, and some $17 million
was paid out to victims of the explosion. 234 The average award came
to $12,195.21.235
VIII. LIABILITY: NEW AND OLD
Tort law has had a tangled and complicated history, but the general
line of development, with regard to rules of liability, is fairly clear.236
226. See, e.g., Texas City Disaster: Hearings on S. 1077 Before a Spec. Subcomm. of the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 84th Cong. 3, 96 (1955) [hereinafter 1955 Senate Judiciary Hearings]; 1954
Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 225. at 15.
227. 1954 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 225, at 61.
228. 1955 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 226, at 33-34; 101 CONG. REC. 12,470 (1955).
229. S. 1077, 84th Cong. (1955); 101 CONG. REC. 12,966 (1955).
230. Texas City Claims Act: Hearings on H.R. 4045 Before a Spec. Subcomm. of the House
Judiciary Comm., 84th Cong. 241-42 (1956).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. MINUTAGLIO, supra note 210, at 264.
235. Id.
236. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 229-302, 467-87 (2d ed.,
1985).
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The nineteenth century rules of tort law were, in general, rules that
limited liability. They were rules about fault, cause, contributory neg-
ligence, assumption of risk, and so on. They were rules that tried to
put a cap on tort liability, not monetarily, but in terms of type-situa-
tions. Some scholars argue that the rules were deliberately framed to
help business in a time of rapid development. Others are not so sure.
The trend of decisions and doctrines seems to have tilted consistently
in favor of enterprise; and this can hardly be dismissed as a coinci-
dence. Underlying the rules, however, was a definite ideology-a way
of looking at the world. And the world was, after all, a dangerous,
crafty, and unpredictable place. In such a world, accidents happen;
they happen all the time; they are an inevitable part of life, and basi-
cally nobody is to blame.
These rules applied mostly to "ordinary" accidents. The story of
their decline and fall is a familiar one, and it belongs largely to the
twentieth century. It is the story of the so-called "liability explo-
sion. '237 Extraordinary accidents-disasters-are another matter.
Here there seems to be a crucial distinction between those disasters
that are the result of "natural" causes and those for which somebody
was responsible-or was arguably responsible. With regard to these,
there was, and continued to be, a strong punitive element in the legal
and social reaction. Criminal justice was a key player. The stories
told here are typical in that regard: there was often a search for some
evil, grasping, careless men, whose callous behavior lay at the root of
the disaster. In cases where nobody could be blamed-where the
event was an "act of God"-perhaps yet another distinction might be
made. In some cases, which we might call "pure" acts of God, there
was a long tradition of federal disaster relief-a rather surprising and
buried history that Michele Landis Dauber has rediscovered. 238 There
are many state instances, too, dating quite far back-relief for Kansas
farmers, for example, suffering from drought or from locusts. 239
In other situations, in which the disaster was an act of God, but
human agency could have mitigated it or could prevent future occur-
rences, the policy of choice was to search for ways to avoid future
harm. We used flood control as an example. There are other exam-
ples, such as reform of zoning or architectural rules after major earth-
quakes. Or there can be a combination of a search for scapegoats, and
237. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 349-76 (2002).
238. Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility, and 'Natural' Disaster Relief: Narrating the Amer-
ican Welfare State, 33 LAW & Soc'y REV. 255 (1999).
239. GRACE A. BROWNING, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POOR RELIEF LEGISLATION IN KANSAS
77-81 (1935).
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a search for structures to reduce danger of recurrence: mine inspec-
tion laws and fire and factory reform. Until quite recently, what did
not follow these blamable disasters, curiously enough, was a torrent of
(successful) law suits. Disasters had the unfortunate tendency to
bankrupt the guilty and leave the innocent high and dry. Disasters
gave rise, not to individual claims, either against the state or against
particular wrongdoers, but to collective claims-claims for prevention
or reform. Relief was not ignored but it was primarily the responsibil-
ity of private charity.
Disasters of all sorts, however, have not been immune from the
ethos of total justice. As was true of tort law generally, reactions to
disaster underwent change in the late twentieth century. The Texas
City disaster was, perhaps, a straw in the wind. There was a de-
mand-and a successful one-for government compensation. Federal
disaster relief, as we said, has a much longer tradition that has been
usually recognized. 240 And such relief is now taken for granted-for
floods, earthquakes, tornados, and the like. Since 1970, there has
been a federal disaster relief law; and since 1978, a government
agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which
administers the program.
"Compensation" is a general term. There are all sorts of compensa-
tion. Victims can receive, for example, a flat sum; or the amount paid
out can vary greatly. In theory, if a person is injured in an accident,
recovery could depend entirely on the physical harm the person suf-
fered-the costs of medical care, the pain and suffering. In practice,
there is another variable: the person's earning power. This last aspect
means that a rich, young person would collect more than a poor, old
person. Damages are supposed to return the victim to the status the
victim had before the accident. Status refers not only to health and
the body, but to position in society. This last aspect of damages is
secondary in many cases of, say, medical malpractice; but it is primary
in disaster relief. It was also primary in many relief aspects of the
New Deal. Quite a few New Deal programs were designed for what
one might call the submerged middle class. In the Work's Progress
Administration (WPA) program, for example, writers were put to
work writing, and painters were given jobs painting. A destitute
writer was treated differently, in other words, from a destitute ditch-
digger. In dealing with programs that shovel out money to victims, it
240. See Michele L. Landis, Let Me Next Time Be Tried by Fire: Disaster Relief and the Origins
of the American Welfare State: 1789-1874, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 967 (1998).
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is important to distinguish between these two aspects of
compensation.
IX. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
The disaster of September 11th was, of course, a severe shock to the
country; it dominated the press and the media for weeks. Over and
over again, millions of people watched the graphic images of death
and destruction so prominently displayed on television. In short or-
der, Congress passed laws that provided for compensation to individ-
ual victims. The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization
Act of 2001 set up a program to pay money to victims of September
11th; it created a federal cause of action for damages and made this
cause of action the exclusive remedy for loss arising out of the inci-
dent.241 Other laws dealt with tax relief and unemployment
compensation.
It is often said that the reaction to September 11th was unprece-
dented; that the programs enacted were a sharp break with tradition
and experience. It is far from clear that this is the case. Of course, the
aim of the compensation laws, in part, was to insulate the airlines and
other possible defendants from private lawsuits. Federalizing claims
was thus a two-edged sword. It provided a fund but cut off alternative
routes to compensation. In this sense, the program was broadly con-
tinuous with past experience: as in other disasters, there was to be
little or no room for individual lawsuits against wrongdoers, or against
people and companies whose alleged negligence might have contrib-
uted to the disaster. Massive lawsuits against the two airlines, or
against the owners of the World Trade Center, were to be precluded.
Certainly, a good tort lawyer could have argued that the airlines had
lax security measures, or that the buildings were improperly designed,
or that they had architectural or engineering flaws. Why else did they
crumble into dust?
One big difference between the reaction to September 11th and
some of the response to disasters of the past was that the government
itself undertook to do the compensating instead of leaving it to private
charities or insurance. Not that private charities were excluded; in
fact, there was a tremendous outpouring of private donation, so big
that it threatened to overwhelm some of the agencies that received
it.242 The move to federalization was foreshadowed, of course, in the
241. The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub.L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat
230 (2001).
242. Robert A. Katz, A Pig in a Python: How the Charitable Response to September 11 Over-
whelmed the Law of Disaster Relief, 36 IND. L. REv. 251 (2003).
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Texas City disaster. After September 11th, the federal government
was anxious to show how seriously it took the events of the day; the
government declared a "war" on terrorism and took steps to prose-
cute this "war." It was an occasion, or an excuse, for a huge increase
in the state security apparatus, and (not insignificantly) a political
windfall for the government.
The public accepted the concept of a "war on terrorism" for all sorts
of reasons. But the public also expected some sort of compensation
scheme-and not only for the victims. Billions were at least promised
for New York. As far as the victims were concerned, because other
avenues were shut off, some sort of plan to pay victims was probably a
political necessity. In the age of the ideology of total justice, this is
only to be expected.
But this is not only the age of total justice; it is also the age of the
imperial presidency. And the age (not coincidentally) of television.
Power, and responsibility, have gravitated to Washington. The whole
country watched September 11th on TV. It was therefore a national
event; and a national event invokes the national cast of characters-
the President, above all-and a national program of action. This is
also the age of FEMA; and FEMA fits in neatly with contemporary
legal culture. FEMA is an expression of the ideology of total justice.
It is also a federal program, in a period when the President appears
every night on TV, and in which Washington dominates prime time
news. The reaction to September 11th is, thus, both continuous and
discontinuous. The events are new, and hence, the reactions; but they
grow out of trends and social forces that had been germinating in the
national soil for decades.
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